







We deﬁne a segregation ordering as a ranking of cities from most segregated
to least segregated. We propose a set of basic properties that any reasonable
segregation ordering should have. We then fully characterize the class of
segregation orderings that satisfy these basic properties. We prove that every
such ordering is representable by a segregation index that has a particular
simple form. Finally, we show that with one rarely used exception, each index
deﬁned in the literature violates one or more of our basic properties.
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1 Introduction
Segregation is a pervasive social issue. The segregation of men and women into
diﬀerent occupations helps explain the gender gap in earnings.1 The continued racial
∗Email addresses: dfrankel@econ.iastate.edu; volij@iastate.edu.
1See Cotter et al [3], Lewis [8], and Macpherson and Hirsh [9].
1segregation of schools appears to contribute to low educational achievement among
minorities.2 Residential segregation between blacks and whites has been blamed for
black poverty, high black mortality, and increases in prejudice among whites.3 In
other contexts, segregation is viewed more positively. Many countries have ethnic
minorities that seek separation and autonomy from other ethnic or religious groups.
The formation of homogeneous living areas has been discussed as a solution to highly
polarized conﬂicts in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Given the salience of segregation, its measurement is a critical issue. The approach
of the existing literature has been to propose a segregation index, to show that it has
a few desirable properties, and to proceed quickly to empirical work. (See Massey and
Denton [10] for a survey.) This has the drawback that it is incomplete: other equally
valid indices are not considered, and the full set of properties that characterize the
index is not studied.
Our approach is diﬀerent. We ﬁrst deﬁne a segregation ordering as a ranking of
cities from most segregated to least segregated. We propose a set of basic properties
that any reasonable segregation ordering should have. We then fully characterize
the class of segregation orderings that satisfy these basic properties. More precisely,
we prove that every such ordering is representable by a segregation index that has a
particular simple form. Finally, we show that with one exception, each index used
in the literature violates one or more of our basic properties.
Our axioms rule out many segregation indices. However, they still leave the
researcher with a choice of indices. Her choice depends on how she answers a central
question. Suppose a segregated area in a city gains population and simultaneously
becomes less segregated. How to weight these opposing developments? For any
given increase in the area’s size, how integrated must the area become for the city’s
level of segregation not to rise?
2See Meldrum and Eaton [11], Orﬁeld [12], and Schiller [13].
3See Cutler and Glaeser [4], Collins and Williams [2], and Kinder and Mendelberg [7], respectively.
2Period 0 Period 1
Segregrated Area Integrated Area Segregrated Area Integrated Area
A B C A B C
Blacks 100 0 100 120 30 50
Whites 0 100 100 30 120 50
Table 1: An example.
This basic tradeoﬀ is illustrated in Table 1. The residents of a single city with
three neighborhoods are surveyed in each of two periods. In period 0, there is one
area of perfect segregation (neighborhoods A and B) and one area of perfect inte-
gration (neighborhood C). In period 1, the segregated area has gained population,
but it has also become less segregated. If the researcher puts more weight on the
segregated area’s growth than on its change in composition, she would say that seg-
regation has risen. If she weights the change in composition more, she would say
that segregation has fallen. This is the essential choice that any researcher must
face. The results of our paper provide guidance by showing how the choice between
reasonable segregation indices (those that satisfy our set of axioms) depends solely
on the researcher’s decision of how much weight to put on these two factors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After setting up some basic notation
in Section 2, we introduce the notion of segregation orders in Section 3 and provide
some known examples of segregation indices that represent various orders. Section 4
proposes some properties that a satisfactory segregation order should satisfy, and
Section 5 characterizes the family of segregation orders that satisfy them all. Section 6
shows that the axioms used in the characterization are logically independent. In
Section 7 we present rank correlations between various segregation indices using data
from the 1990 U.S. Census.
32N o t a t i o n
Throughout the paper we use the language of urban racial segregation because it
is the best known example. Our results apply in other contexts though: religious
segregation, gender segregation, etc.
A neighborhood i is characterized by a pair (Bi,W i) of non-negative real numbers.
The ﬁrst and second components are the numbers of blacks and whites, respectively,
in i.Acity is a ﬁnite set of neighborhoods. For example, {(1,2),(0,1)} denotes a
city with two neighborhoods, the ﬁrst containing one black and two whites, and the
second having just a single white. The set of neighborhoods of the city X is denoted
N(X).
Although we use set notation, a city can contain two distinct neighborhoods with
identical numbers of blacks and whites. For example, {(1,2),(1,2)} contains two
distinct neighborhoods; it is diﬀerent city from the city {(1,2)}, which contains only
one. On the other hand, the order of neighborhoods does not matter; e.g., the city
{(1,2),(3,4)} can also be described just as well by {(3,4),(1,2)}.
Given a city X,w ed e n o t eb yB(X)a n dW(X) the total numbers of blacks and
whites, respectively: B(X)=
 
i∈N(X) Bi and W(X)=
 
i∈N(X) Wi.W h e n i t i s
clear to which city we are referring, we will write simply B and W. We restrict









: the proportion of blacks in neighborhood i
T = B + W: the total population of the city








: the proportion of the city’s whites that live in neighborhood i.
4For any city X and any nonnegative constant c, cX denotes the city that results
from multiplying the number of blacks and whites in each neighborhood of X by c:
cX =( cBi,cW i)i∈N(X). For any two cities X and Y ,l e tX   Y denote the union
of X and Y . As in the case of individual cities, we keep identical neighborhoods
separate. For instance, if X = {(1,2),(3,4)} and Y = {(1,2)} then X   Y =
{(1,2),(1,2),(3,4)}.
Neighborhood i is representative of the city if the proportion of the city’s blacks in
the neighborhood equals the proportion of the city’s whites: if pi = P.A n e i g h b o r -
hood that is not representative of the city is said to be unrepresentative.I f pi >P,
blacks are overrepresented in neighborhood i;i fpi <P,b l a c k sa r eunderrepresented.
3 Segregation orderings, and their measures
A segregation order, , is a complete and transitive binary relation on the set of
cities. We interpret X  Y to mean “city X is at least as segregated as city Y.” The
relations ∼ and   are derived from  in the usual way.4
Segregation orders are usually represented by segregation indices. A segregation
index assigns to each city a nonnegative number which is meant to capture its level of
segregation. Given a segregation index S, the associated segregation order is deﬁned
by X   Y ⇔ S(X) ≥ S(Y ). Clearly, a segregation order may be represented by
more than one index.
3.1 Examples of segregation indices
The following indices have been used to study segregation (Massey and Denton [10]).5
4That is X ∼ Y if both X  Y and Y  X; X   Y if X  Y but not Y  X.
5Massey and Denton [10] also survey several other indices that require additional information
about neighborhoods’ locations to be computed.
5The Index of Dissimilarity This index measures the proportion of either racial
group that would need to be reallocated across neighborhoods in order to obtain
perfect integration. For example, if bi >w i, one needs to remove a proportion
bi − wi of the city’s blacks from neighborhood i for the neighborhood to be
representative; if bi <w i, one needs to add a proportion wi − bi of the city’s
blacks to neighborhood i for the neighborhood to be representative. Thus, the






|bi − wi| (1)
where we divide by 2 to avoid double counting. This index was introduced to
the literature by Jahn et al [6].








|biwj − bjwi| (2)
This index is adapted from the income inequality index of the same name. It
is related to the Lorenz curve, which plots the cumulative proportion of whites
against the cumulative proportion of blacks, having sorted neighborhoods in
increasing order of the percentage pi of blacks. The Gini Index equals the area
between this curve and the 45 degree line.








titj |pi − pj|
T2P(1 − P)
but
titj |pi − pj|
T2P(1 − P)
=
(Bi + Wi)(Bj + Wj)
 


















= |biwj − bjwi|






ti (E − Ei)( 3 )
where




















This index, adapted from the information theory literature, was proposed by
Theil and Finizza [16].
















The Atkinson index was originally deﬁned as a measure of income inequality
(Atkinson [1]).
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A variant of this index was used by Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor [5] to measure
the evolution of segregation in American cities.
4A x i o m s
A variety of segregation indices are available for researchers. Are any of them more
desirable than others? In this section we propose a number of properties that, in our
view, a satisfactory segregation order must satisfy.8 The next section characterizes
the family of indices that satisfy all these properties.
The ﬁrst axiom states that if whites become blacks and vice-versa, the segregation
of a city does not change.
Race Symmetry (RS) The segregation in a city is unaﬀected by relabeling the
races: (Bi,W i)i∈N(X) ∼ (Wi,B i)i∈N(X).
The next axiom states that the overall size of a group does not aﬀect how segre-
gated it is from another group. This is one of the ﬁve requirements that Jahn et al [6]
say a satisfactory measure of segregation should satisfy.9 To illustrate, suppose that
8With some abuse of language, we will say that a segregation index satisﬁes a property if its
induced segregation order does.
9Jahn et al [6] write:
A satisfactory measure of ecological segregation should (1) be expressed a single
quantitative value so as to facilitate such statistical procedures as comparison, classi-
ﬁcation, and correlation; (2) be relatively easy to compute; (3) not be distorted by the
size of the total population, the proportion of Negroes, or the area of a city; (4) be
generally applicable to all cities; and (5) diﬀerentiate degrees of segregation in such a
8the distribution of black albinos is the same as the distribution of black non-albinos
across neighborhoods: for instance both have a 25% chance of living in neighborhood
1, a 13% chance of living in neighborhood 2, and so on. Then black albinos are as
segregated from whites as black non-albinos are, even though the absolute number of
black albinos is very small.
Scale Invariance (SI) The segregation in a city is unchanged if the number of
agents of a given race is multiplied by the same nonzero factor in all neigh-
borhoods: for any α,β > 0, (Bi,W i)i∈N(X) ∼ (αBi,βW i)i∈N(X).
All the indices discussed in the previous section satisfy SI, except for the entropy
and isolation indices (see section 6).
The following axiom gives conditions under which segregation rises if blacks are
moved to neighborhoods where there are more of them. (Together with Race Sym-
metry, it implies an analogous property for whites.) It requires that moving ε>0
blacks from one neighborhood to another should increase the level of segregation if
the percentage of blacks is higher in the destination neighborhood than in the origin
neighborhood.
Monotonicity (M) For any city X,l e ti,j ∈ N(X) be two neighborhoods such that
1 >p i ≥ pj > 0
and for some ε ∈ (0,B j], let X  be the city that is obtained from X by mov-
ing ε blacks from neighborhood j to neighborhood i.T h a t i s X  is that city
(B 
k,W 
k)k∈N(X) in which (B 
i,W 
i)=( Bi + ε,Wi), (B 
j,W 
j)=( Bj − ε,Wj), and
(B 
k,W 
k)=( Bk,W k) for all k  = i,j,T h e nX , is more segregated than X:
X    X.
way that the distribution of intmediate scores cover most of the possible range between
the extremes of 0 and 100.
Property (3) is Scale Invariance.
9All indices described in the previous section, except for the index of dissimilarity,
satisfy monotonicity.
The next axiom states that under limited conditions, adjoining the same set of
neighborhoods to each of two diﬀerent cities does not aﬀect which of the two cities is
more segregated.
Independence (IND) Let X, Y ,a n dZ be three cities. Suppose they all have the
same proportion of blacks and that X and Y have the same total populations.
Then X  Y if and only if X   Z  Y   Z.
All indices described in the previous section satisfy IND except the Gini index.
The next property gives conditions under which two neighborhoods can be com-
bined without aﬀecting the level of segregation in a city: if two neighborhoods have
the same proportion of blacks or at least one of them is empty, then combining them
does not change the city’s level of segregation.10 One implication is that the presence
of empty neighborhoods can have no eﬀect on a city’s level of segregation.
Composition Invariance (CI) Let X be a city in which, for some i,j ∈ N(X),
either pi = pj or at least one of the neighborhoods i and j is empty. Let X  be
result of combining neighborhoods i and j.T h e n X ∼ X .
All the indices described in the previous section satisfy CI.
Continuity is a technical condition that guarantees the existence of a segregation
index.
Continuity (C) For any cities X, Y ,a n dZ,w h e r eX and Y have the same propor-
tion of blacks and the same total population, the sets
{c ∈ [0,1] : cX   (1 − c)Y  Z} and {c ∈ [0,1] : Z  cX   (1 − c)Y }
are closed.
10For example, X = {(1,2),(2,4)} is just as segregated as the city that contains the single
neighborhood (3,6).
105 Main Results
We believe the above axioms are intuitive and desirable properties. Each of them,
in isolation, is satisﬁed by most of the segregation measures used in prior literature.
However, with one exception, none of the indices used by researchers satisﬁes all of
these properties. More precisely, each of the ﬁve indices discussed in section 3.1
violates exactly one of the axioms listed in section 4, except the Atkinson index with
a particular parameter. We state this fact as the following observation, whose proof
is a corollary of our main characterization theorem and of the results of section 6.
Observation 1 Of the indices deﬁned in section 3.1, only the Atkinson index with
parameter β equal to 1/2 satisﬁes all the axioms RS, SI, M, I, CI, and C.
The above observation holds not because the axioms are collectively diﬃcult to
satisfy. Indeed, as our main theorem shows, there is a continuum of segregation
measures that satisfy them all:
Theorem 1 The segregation ordering  satisﬁes axioms RS, SI, M, I, CI, and C, if
and only if there is a function f :[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → with the following properties:
1. For all cities X and Y ,
X  Y if and only if
 
i∈N(X)




2. f is symmetric, homogeneous of degree 1, and strictly convex on the simplex
∆={(b,w) ∈ [0,1] : b + w =1 }.
In addition, the function f(c,1−c) is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation.
That is f and g both satisfy properties 1 and 2 if and only if there is are constants
α ∈ (0,∞) and β ∈  , such that
f(c,1 − c)=αg(c,1 − c)+β ∀c ∈ [0,1].
115.1 Discussion
Some remarks are in order:
1. The fact that f is symmetric, homogeneous of degree 1, and strictly convex on
the simplex implies that f(b,w) has a strict global minimum at b = w:w h e n
the neighborhood is representative of the city.
2. The uniqueness of f up to positive aﬃne transformations allows us to choose f
so that




• For any completely segregated city X (in which, for all i,e i t h e rbi =0o r
wi =0 ) ,
 
i∈N(X) f (bi,w i)=1 . 11
The value f(b,w) represents the contribution of a neighborhood that contains a
proportion b of the city’s blacks and a proportion w of the city’s whites to the overall
segregation of the city. Since f is homogeneous of degree one, this contribution can be
decomposed into two factors. The ﬁrst one is its size relative to other neighborhoods,
as measured by b + w. The other is related to the degree of dissimiliarity of the
neighborhood, and it is captured by the normalized diﬀerence in the proportions of
the city’s blacks and whites who live in the neighborhood, d = |b−w|/(b+w). More
formally, let g :[ 0 ,1] → be deﬁned by
g(d)=f((1 + d)/2,(1 − d)/2) (6)
11One can easily verify that these two properties hold if and only if f(1/2,1/2) = 0 and f(1,0) =
1/2.
12Then, the neighborhood’s contribution to the city’s segregation is







=( b + w)g(d).
T h es i z ec o m p o n e n tb + w enters linearly: the contribution of a neighborhood to
the city’s segregation is proportional to the neighborhood’s size. In contrast, the
neighborhood’s degree of dissimilarity, d, may enter nonlinearly, but g is increasing
and strictly convex by (6) and property 2 of Theorem 1. A simple example is
g(d)=dn for any real n>1. The index of dissimilarity corresponds to n =1 ,w h i c h
is ruled out by Monotonicity: if blacks are moved from a neighborhood in which they
are overrepresented to one in which they are even more overrepresented, the index
of dissimilarity does not rise. The axiom of Monotonicity states that segregation
must rise, but not by how much. Accordingly, there are indices that are arbitrarily
close to the index of dissimilarity that do satisfy all of our axioms; take n =1+ε for
instance.
This example relates to our discussion in the introduction. The presence of an
unrepresentative neighborhood (in which b  = w) contributes to a city’s degree of
segregation in the amount f(b,w)=( b + w)g(d). The extent of this contribution
depends on the tradeoﬀ between two aspects of the neighborhood. The ﬁrst is its size
relative to other neighborhoods. This is represented by the sum of the proportions
of the city’s blacks and whites in the neighborhood, b + w. The second factor is the
degree to which the neighborhood is unrepresentative. This is captured by the degree
of dissimilarity, d. The elasticity of the neighborhood’s contribution with respect to
size is 1 while its elasticity with respect to unrepresentativeness depends on g;w h e n
g(d)=dn,i ti sn. An increase in the second elasticity makes the segregation index
more sensitive to a given percentage increase in a neighborhood’s unrepresentative-
ness, without changing its sensitivity to the neighborhood’s size. Thus, it captures
the tradeoﬀ between a neighborhood’s unrepresentativeness and its size.
13An alternative interpretation of the function f is as follows. Noting that bi =
(pi/P)(ti/T)a n dwi =
 
(1 − pi)/(1 − p)
 












That is, the contribution of neighborhood i to the city’s segregation can be decom-
posed into two factors. The ﬁrst one is the size of the neighborhood relative to the
whole city, ti/T. This relative size enters linearly in the segregation index. The sec-
ond one depends on the ratio pi/P of the proportion of blacks in i, and the proportion
of blacks in the whole city. The farther away this proportion is from one, the higher
the contribution of neighborhood i to the city’s segregation. And since f is convex,
the marginal segregation caused by a further departure of pi/P from 1 is increasing.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1.
We ﬁrst prove the “only if” part. Assume the segregation ordering  satisﬁes the
axioms. We now build a segregation index that represents . First, Lemmas 1
and 2 show that the order  has maximal elements (the set of cities with no mixed
neighborhoods) and minimal elements (the set of cities in which every neighborhood
is representative).
Lemma 1 All cities in which every neighborhood is representative have the same
degree of segregation. Any such city is strictly less segregated than any city in which
some neighborhood is unrepresentative.
Proof. Consider any city in which at least one neighborhood is unrepresentative.
Suppose one progressively moves the agents who are overrepresented in each neighbor-
hood to neighborhoods in which they are underrepresented, until all neighborhoods
are representative. By M, this procedure makes the city strictly less segregated. By
CI, one can then merge all of the city’s neighborhoods into a single neighborhood
without changing the city’s degree of segregation. Finally, by SI, any city with a
14single neighborhood is as segregated as any other city with a single neighborhood.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 All cities that have no mixed neighborhoods12 have the same degree of
segregation, and are strictly more segregated than any city in which some neighborhood
is mixed.
Proof. Start with any city that has at least one mixed neighborhood. Now
progressively move agents from neighborhoods in which they are underrepresented to
neighborhoods in which they are overrepresented. Continue until no neighborhood
is racially mixed. By M, the resulting city must be strictly more segregated. By CI,
one can then combine all the black (white) neighborhoods into a single black (white)
neighborhood without changing the degree of segregation in the city. Finally, by SI,
every city with only two neighborhoods, one of which contains only whites and the
other only blacks, is as segregated as any other such city. Q.E.D.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, no city is more segregated than the city X = {(1,0),(0,1)}
while none is less segregated than the city X = {(1,1)}. Lemma 3 shows that every
city X is as segregated as the union of the scaled cities αX and (1−α)X for a unique
weight α that lies between zero and one.
Lemma 3 For any city X,t h e r ei sau n i q u eαX ∈ [0,1] such that
X ∼ αXX   (1 − αX)X (7)
Proof: See Appendix.
We deﬁne the segregation index S as this weight: S(X)=αX for any city
X,w h e r eαX is the number identiﬁed in Lemma 3. By Lemma 3, S is indeed a
function. (It has a single value for each argument.) Lemma 4 states that an increase
12This is the set of cities X such that for all neighborhoods i ∈ N(X), either bi =0o rwi =0 .
15in segregation corresponds to an increase in S: for any cities X and Y , X  Y if
and only if S(X) ≥ S(Y ). In other words, the index S represents the segregation
ordering .
Lemma 4 Let 1 ≥ α>β≥ 0.T h e n
αX   (1 − α)X   βX   (1 − β)X
Proof: See Appendix.
It remains to show that this segregation index that represents  has the requisite
form. For any city X,l e tT(X) denote the population of X. Lemma 5 shows that
the index is linear:
Lemma 5 For any cities X and Y with equal proportions of blacks,






S(Y )( 8 )
Proof: See Appendix.
We now build a function f(b,w), with all the required properties of this function,
such that the index S is just the sum of the function f evaluated at each neighborhood
of X:
for all cities X, S(X)=
 
i∈N(X)
f(bi,w i)( 9 )
There are two cases:
1. If b + w =1 ,l e tX be the symmetric city {(b,w),(w,b)} and set f(b,w)e q u a l
to S(X)/2. By Race Symmetry, f(b,w)=f(w,b).











if b + w>0
0i f b + w =0 .
16The function f is clearly symmetric. By construction it is homogeneous of degree 1.
Also by construction, f(α,α)=0a n df(α,0) = f(0,α)=α/2.
Lemma 6 Equation (9) holds for the function f deﬁned above.
Proof: See Appendix.
It remains to show that the function f is strictly convex on the simplex ∆. Let
(b,w) be in the interior of ∆; assume, without loss of generality, that b ≥ w.L e t
X be the symmetric city {(b,w),(w,b)}.L e t ε<w=1− b and consider the city
X  =( ( b + ε,w − ε),(w − ε,b + ε)), in which a proportion ε of the city’s blacks have
moved to the ﬁrst neighborhood, in which they are weakly overrepresented, and the
same proportion of the city’s whites have moved to the second neighborhood, in which
they are weakly overrepresented. By Monotonicity, we know that X  is strictly more
segregated than X. In other words, S(X ) >S (X), which implies
f (b + ε,w − ε)+f (w + ε,b − ε) >f(b,w)+f (w,b)
or, using the symmetry of f,
f (b + ε,w − ε)+f (b − ε,w + ε)
2
>f(b,w)
Strict convexity of f on the simplex now follows from the following Lemma, letting
x =( b + ε,w − ε)a n dy =( b − ε,w + ε).
Lemma 7 Let g :[ 0 ,1]2 →  + be homogeneous of degree 1 and satisfy the following






.T h e n g is convex on [0,1]2. Moreover, for any x,y ∈ [0,1]2 that
do not lie on the same ray through the origin (i.e., such that there is no c ∈ such
that x = cy or y = cx), g is strictly convex along the line segment that connects x
and y.
17Proof: See Appendix.
The above results establish the “only if” part. The proof of the “if” direction is
as follows. Let f :[ 0 ,1]2 → [0,∞) be a symmetric function that is strictly convex














Now deﬁne   from S as follows: for any cities X and Y , X   Y if and only if
S(X) ≥ S(Y ). We now show that   satisﬁes all the axioms:
1. Race Symmetry, because f is symmetric;















3. Monotonicity: Assume that city X is such that 1 >B i/(Bi + Wi) ≥ Bj/(Bi +
Wj) > 0f o rs o m ei,j ∈ N. Suppose we move δ ∈ (0,B j]b l a c k sf r o mj to i.
The segregation of the city goes up if
f(bi + ε,wi)+f(bj − ε,wj) >f(bi,w i)+f(bj,w j),
where ε = δ/B. Equivalently, the segregation goes up if
f(bi + ε,wi) − f(bi,w i)
ε
>
f(bj,w j) − f(bj − ε,wj)
ε
.
Multiplying the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of the in-
equality by wi/wj and using the homogeneity of f, we conclude that segregation
goes up if




i,w i) − f(b 





wj and ε  = ε
wi
wj.B u t Bi/(Bi + Wi) >B j/(Bi + Wj) implies
bi/bj = Bi/Bj ≥ Wi/Wj = wi/wj,s obi ≥ b 
i. This implies bi + ε>b  
i and
18bi >b  
i − ε . Consequently, inequality (10) can be interpreted as saying that
the “partial derivative” of f with respect to its ﬁrst argument is increasing. By
Lemma 7, f is strictly convex on [0,1]2, except along rays through the origin.
Equation (10) follows from this property.






























f (Kbi,Kw i) ≥
 
j∈N(Y )
f (Kbj,Kw j) ⇔
 
i∈N(X) f (Kbi,Kw i)
+
 
k∈N(Z) f (K bk,K wk)
≥
 
j∈N(Y ) f (Kbj,Kw j)
+
 








5. Composition Invariance because f is homogeneous of degree one;
6. Continuity: If B(X)=B(Y )a n dW(X)=W(Y ), then S(cX   (1 − c)Y )i sa
linear function of c:
S(cX   (1 − c)Y )=c
 
i∈N(X)




Thus, {c ∈ [0,1] : cX   (1 − c)Y  Z} and {c ∈ [0,1] : Z  cX   (1 − c)Y } are
each closed intervals.
19As for uniqueness, let us say that the function f :[ 0 ,1]2 →  + represents the
segregation order  if it satisﬁes properties 1 and 2 of Theorem 1. Suppose g :
[0,1]2 →  + represents the segregation order . Deﬁne the function f :∆→ by
f(c,1 − c)=αg(c,1 − c)+β for c ∈ [0,1]; extend f in a homogeneous-of-degree-1
way to the rest of of [0,1]2.T h e n f also represents : for all cities X and Y ,
 
i∈N(X)
f (bi,w i) ≥
 
j∈N(Y )

































g (bi,w i) ≥
 
j∈N(Y )
g(bj,w j) ⇐⇒ X  Y
Conversely, assume that both f and g represent : for all cities X and Y ,














Let X = {(c,1 − c),(1 − c,c)} for some c ∈ [0,1]. By Lemma 3, there is a unique
αX ∈ [0,1] such that
X ∼ αXX +( 1− αX)X.
This implies, using symmetry and homogeneity of f and g,t h a t
















































and α ∈ (0,∞) by the strict convexity of f and g. Q.E.D.
206 Analysis of various indices and the independence
of the axioms
In this section we will show that except for the Atkinson index with parameter β =
1/2, each of the indices described in Subsection 3.1 fails to satisfy one of the axioms
used in Theorem 1. Two additional examples will complete the proof that all the
axioms are logically independent. We state our results as a series of claims, which
are proved in the appendix.
Claim 1 The Dissimilarity index D satisﬁes RS, SI, IND, CI, and C, but fails M.
Claim 2 The Gini index G satisﬁes RS, SI, M, CI, and C, but fails IND.
Claim 3 The Entropy index H satisﬁes RS, M, I, CI, and C, but fails SI.
Claim 4 The Atkinson index Aβ satisﬁes SI, M, I, CI, and C. However, it violates
RS unless β =1 /2.13
Claim 5 The Isolation index J satisﬁes RS, M, I, CI, and C, but violates SI.
The previous claims show that M, SI, RS, and IND are each logically independent
of the other axioms. We now show that CI and C are also independent.
13The Atkinson Index with parameter β =1 /2 satisﬁes all of our axioms. Indeed, it induces the
same segregation ordering as 1 − (1 − A1/2)1/2, a monotonic transformation of A1/2 that can be
w r i t t e ni nt h ef o r m
 
f(bi,w i):




















It is easily veriﬁed that f(bi,w i) satisﬁes all of the properties of Theorem 1.
21To show that CI is logically independent, consider the following segregation or-
dering:
X   Y ⇔

   
   
|N(X)| > |N(Y )|
or
|N(X)| = |N(Y )| and A1/2(X) ≥ A1/2(Y )
,
where for any city Z, |N(Z)| is the number of neighborhoods of Z,a n dA1/2 is
the Atkinson index with parameter 1/2. Clearly,   does not satisfy CI. On the
other hand, since both A1/2 and |N| satisfy RS, SI, and I, so does  .S i n c e t h e
migration considered in the axiom of Monotonicity does not change the number of
neighborhoods, and since A1/2 satisﬁes Monotonicity, so does  . Finally,   satisﬁes
continuity: for any cities X, Y ,a n dZ,w h e r eX and Y have the same proportion
of blacks and the same total population, let S = {c ∈ [0,1] : cX   (1 − c)Y  Z}.
There are two cases:
1. if |N(X)| + |N(Y )|  = |N(Z)|,t h e nS is either the empty set or the whole
interval [0,1], both of which are closed;
2. if |N(X)|+|N(Y )| = |N(Z)|,t h e nS equals
 
c ∈ [0,1] : A1/2(cX   (1 − c)Y ) ≥ A1/2(Z)
 
,
which is closed since A1/2 satisﬁes continuity.
Finally, we build an index that satisﬁes all the axioms except for C. Consider the
following segregation ordering:
X   Y ⇔

   
   
A1/2(X) >A 1/2(Y )
or
A1/2(X)=A1/2(Y )a n dD(X) ≥ D(Y )
where D is the Index of Dissimilarity and A1/2 is the Atkinson index with parameter
1/2. Since both the Atkinson and the Dissimilarity indices satisfy RS, SI, IND,
and CI, so does  . The order   satisﬁes M because A does. However,   does
nor satisfy continuity. To see this, consider the cities X = {(1,0),(0,1)}, X =
22{(1/2,1/2),(1/2,1/2)},a n dX = {(1/5,4/5),(4/5,1/5)}.N o t et h a tA1/2(cX   (1 −
c)X)=c while A1/2(X)=1 /5, and that D(cX   (1 − c)X)=c while D(X)=3 /5.
Consequently,
{c ∈ [0,1] : cX   (1 − c)X   X} =( 1 /5,1].
7 Empirical Correlations
In this section we present empirical correlations between the various segregation in-
dices studied in this paper. In addition to the ﬁve indices discussed in section 3.1,
we consider the indices In(N)=
 
i∈N(X) (bi + wi)
 




   
n
for n =2 ,4,8,16. These
indices, which satisfy our axioms for any n>1, are discussed after Theorem 1. The
universe is the 313 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) present in the U.S. Census
in 1990; the dataset is from Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor [5].
Table 2 presents rank correlations between these indices for the 313 MSA’s in this
dataset. Most of the indices are highly correlated with most of the other indices,
even those that violate some of our axioms. A striking exception is the index of
isolation (J), which violates the principle of scale invariance.
Appendix
Lemma 3 relies on Lemma 4, so we prove Lemma 4 ﬁrst.
Proof of Lemma 4:B y C I ,
αX   (1 − α)X ∼ βX   (α − β)X   (1 − α)X
and
βX   (1 − β)X ∼ βX   (α − β)X   (1 − α)X
23I2 I4 I8 I16 D H A J G
I2 1 0.99 0.96 0.90 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.81 0.98
I4 0.99 1 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.998 0.83 0.96
I8 0.96 0.99 1 0.98 0.92 0.93 0.98 0.81 0.91
I16 0.90 0.94 0.98 1 0.85 0.97 0.95 0.75 0.84
D 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.85 1 0.93 0.97 0.79 0.99
H 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.93 1 0.94 0.96 0.92
A 0.99 0.998 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.94 1 0.80 0.96
J 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.79 0.96 0.80 1 0.79
G 0.98 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.79 1
Table 2: Rank correlations of segregation indices for 313 MSA’s in 1990 census.
By M, (α − β)X   (α − β)X. Since the numbers of blacks and whites are equal in
city X (X), they are also equal in city cX (cX) for any c>0. So by IND,
βX   (α − β)X   (1 − α)X   βX   (α − β)X   (1 − α)X
The result follows by transitivity. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:B y C ,
 




α ∈ [0,1] : X  αX   (1 − α)X
 
are closed sets. Any αX satisﬁes (7) if and only if it is in the intersection of these two
sets. The sets are each nonempty by Lemmas 1 and 2. Their union is the whole unit
interval since  is complete. Since the interval [0,1] is connected, the intersection of
the two sets must be nonempty. By Lemma 4, their intersection cannot contain more
than one element. Thus, their intersection contains a single element αX. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5:L e t ω = W(X)/B(X)=W(Y )/B(X) be the common ratio
of whites to black is each city, and let X  = ωX and Y   = ωY. Note that the
proportion of blacks is 1/2 both in X  and in Y  .S i n c eX    Y   = ω(X   Y ), by SI,
24X   Y ∼ X    Y  . Therefore,
S (X   Y )=S (X
    Y
 )
We need to show that S (X    Y  ) equals the right-hand side of (8). By SI, X  ∼ X
and Y   ∼ Y . Thus, by SI,
X
  ∼ αXX   (1 − αX)X ∼ αX
T(X )
2






  ∼ αYX   (1 − αY )X ∼ αY
T(Y  )
2




where the ﬁrst and third city in each equation have equal proportions of blacks and
whites and equal total populations. Hence,
X






















































αXT(X )+αYT(Y  )




(1 − αX)T(X )+( 1− αY )T(Y  )
T(X )+T(Y  )
 
X
where the ﬁrst and second equivalences follow from I, the third from CI, and the
fourth from SI. Since the weights on the two cities in the last line add to one,
S (X
    Y
 )=
αXT(X )+αYT(Y  )
T(X )+T(Y  )
=
T(X )
T(X )+T(Y  )
S(X)+
T(Y  )










P r o o fo fL e m m a6 : For any c ∈ [0,1], let Xc be the symmetric, 2-neighborhood
city {(c,1 − c),(1 − c,c)}. By deﬁnition of f and Race Symmetry, f(c,1 − c)=
25f(1 − c,c)=S(Xc)/2. Consequently,
S(X
c)=f(c,1 − c)+f(1 − c,c). (11)
Now let X (Bi,W i)i∈N(X) be any city and assume for the moment that it has equal
n u m b e r so fb l a c k sa n dw h i t e s( B = W). Let X  be the city that results from swapping
blacks and whites: X  =( Wi,B i)i∈N(X).B y R S , S(X)=S(X ). By IND, S(X  
X)=S(X   X ). By CI and SI, S(X   X)=S(X). Thus, S(X   X )=S(X).
We can partition X   X  into |N(X)| symmetric subcities, where subcity i is Xi =
{(Bi,W i),(Wi,B i)}.T h a ti s ,X   X  =
 
i∈N(X) Xi. Note that each subcity has the
same proportion of blacks. Therefore, by Lemma 5,













































where the second equality follows from equation (11), and the last line follows since
B = W.
For general cities X, we can make the citywide proportions of blacks and whites
equal by multiplying the number of blacks in each neighborhood by W/B.B y S I ,
the index of segregation remains unchanged. Moreover, the proportions of the city’s
26blacks and whites who reside in each neighborhood, bi and wi, are unchanged as well.
Thus, the preceding formula holds for any city. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 1. The Index of dissimilarity can be written as D(X)=
 
i∈N(X) f(bi,w i)
where for all (b,w) ∈ [0,1]2, f(b,w)=|b − w|/2. Note that f is an homogeneous
of degree one and symmetric function. Therefore, since the proof of the “if” part
of Theorem 1 uses the assumption of strict convexity on the simplex only to show
monotonicity, that same proof shows that D s a t i s ﬁ e sR S ,S I ,C I ,I ,a n dC .I ti sw e l l -
known that D fails Monotonicity: if 1 >p i ≥ pj > 0a n das m a l ln u m b e rε of blacks
move from neighborhood j to neighborhood i,t h e nD r i s e so n l yi fpi ≥ P ≥ pj.
Otherwise, D is unchanged. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 2. Clearly, the Gini index G satisﬁes RS and SI. It satisﬁes C
because G is a continuous function of the proportions of blacks and whites that live
in each neighborhood. As a result, for any two cities X and Y , G(cX   (1 − c)Y )
is a continuous function of c ∈ [0,1], and consequently, the sets {c ∈ [0,1] : G(cX  
(1 − c)Y ) ≥ k} and {c ∈ [0,1] : G(cX   (1 − c)Y ) ≤ k} are closed. It also satisﬁes
Monotonicity: assume that 1 >p i ≥ pj > 0a n dt h a tε ∈ (0,B j]b l a c k sm o v ef r o m
neighborhood j to neighborhood i. We need to show that G must rise. The terms
of G that can change are:
 
k∈N
(|biwk − bkwi| + |bjwk − bkwj|)
For k such that bk/wk >b i/wi or bk/wk <b j/wj, the term |biwk − bkwi|+|bjwk − bkwj|
does not change. For k such that bi/wi ≥ bk/wk ≥ bj/wj (e.g., k = i,j), the term
rises. Thus, G satisﬁes M. G also satisﬁes Composition Invariance: if neighborhoods
i and j have the same proportion of blacks, this implies that there is a constant c such
that bi = cbj and wi = cwj. The combined neighborhood i∧j contains a proportion
27bi∧j =( c +1 ) bj of the city’s blacks and wi∧j =( c +1 ) wj of the city’s whites. But
 
k∈N









so the sum of the terms in G that relate to neighborhood i and j remains the same
if the neighborhoods are combined.
However, G does not satisfy Independence. Let X = Z = {(1,2),(3,2)}, Y =
{(2,1),(2,3)},a n dZ = X. The three cities have equal numbers of blacks and whites,
and the same total populations. But while G(X)=G(Y )=1 /4, G(X  Z)=1 /4  =
G(Y   Z)=9 /32. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 . The Entropy index, H, clearly satisﬁes RS and C. For two
neighborhoods i and j in which pi = pj,w eh a v eEi = Ej = Ei∧j and ti∧j = ti + tj,
where i ∧ j denotes the result of merging i and j into a single neighborhood. So H
satisﬁes CI. It is also straightforward to verify that H satisﬁes Independence. To
see that H satisﬁes Monotonicity, assume that 1 >p i ≥ pj > 0a n dt h a tε ∈ (0,B j]
blacks move from neighborhood j to neighborhood i. We need to show that H must





















Hence, tiEi+tjEj must fall: M holds. To see that H violates Scale Invariance, note
that H ((1,9),(9,1)) = 0.53 while H ((1,90),(9,10)) = 0.44. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC l a i m4 . The Atkinson index with β  =1 /2 satisﬁes all the axioms
except for RS. To see this, note that the Atkinson index Aβ is ordinally equivalent
to 1−(1−Aβ)1−β, which can be written, for any city X,a s
 
i∈N(X) f(bi,w i)w h e r e ,
28f(b,w)=b+w
2 −bβw1−β. Consequently, an argument analogous to the one of the “if”
part of Theorem 1 shows that it satisﬁes SI, I, CI, and C. To verify M, assume that
1 >p i ≥ pj > 0
and that ε ∈ (0,B j] blacks move from neighborhood j to neighborhood i. We need
to show that Aβ cannot fall. The new index is
c − w
1−β
i (bi + ε)
β − w
1−β
j (bj − ε)
β
where c is a constant that is unchanged by the migration. The derivative of this
quantity with respect to ε is
βw
1−β
i (bi + ε)
β−1 − βw
1−β











This is strictly negative since ε>0a n dbi/wi ≥ bj/wj. So M holds. To see that Aβ
does not satisfy RS for β  =1 /2, consider the symmetric cities X = ((1,0),(1,2)) and
Y = ((0,1),(2,1)). It can be checked that Aβ(X)  = Aβ(Y ) unless β =1 /2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 5. To see that the Isolation index, J, satisﬁes CI, note ﬁrst that











and consider two neighborhoods i and j such that pi = pj = p. Then for the merged





























































































 3 > 0
Thus, if bi/wi >b j/wj and ε blacks are moved from neighborhood j to neighborhood
i, J must increase: J satisﬁes M. It is straightforward to verify that J satisﬁes IND
and C as well. J also satisﬁes RS. To see this, let p 
i =1− pi and P   =1− P;l e t
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so J satisﬁes RS. Finally, since J ({(1,2),(3,2)})=1 /15 while J ({(2,2),(6,2)})=
1/16, J violates SI. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7. We ﬁrst show that g is strictly convex along the line segment
joining any x =( x1,x 2) ∈ ∆a n da n yy =( y1,y 2) ∈ ∆ such that x  = y:t h a t
for any c ∈ (0,1), (1 − c)g(x)+cg(y) >g((1 − c)x + cy) (13)
Deﬁne h(c)=g((1 − c)x + cy) − [(1 − c)g(x)+cg(y)]. Let
k =s u p
c∈[0,1]
h(c)
30This is the maximum vertical distance between g and the chord connecting (x,g(x)) to
(y,g(y)). Obviously (setting c =0o rc =1 ) ,k ≥ 0. We claim that k =0 . O t h e r w i s e
for any ε>0t h e r ei sacε such that h(cε) >k− ε>0. Let x  =( 1− cε)x + cεy.
Without loss of generality assume cε ≤ 1/2. Let y  =( 1− 2cε)x +2 cεy,w h i c h







= g (x ), so g(y ) > 2g(x ) − g(x), so
h(2c
ε)=g(y












ε) > 2(k − ε)
which exceeds k for small enough ε. This is a contradiction, so k =0 .
Now suppose that h(c)=0f o rs o m ec ∈ (0,1); assume w.l.o.g. that c ≤ 1/2. An
argument analogous to the above implies that h(2c) > 0, which contradicts the prior
result that k = 0. Hence, h(c) < 0 for all c ∈ (0,1), which establishes (13).
Since g is homogeneous, it is (weakly) convex along any ray through the origin.
Thus, if we show the last claim of the lemma, we will be done. Consider any
x,y ∈ [0,1]2 that do not lie on the same ray through the origin. This implies, in
particular, that neither x nor y is the origin (0,0). We will show that g is strictly
convex along the line segment joining x and y: that for any c ∈ (0,1), the point
z =( 1− c)x + cy =( z1,z 2)s a t i s ﬁ e sg(z) < (1 − c)g(x)+cg(y). Let x  = 1
x1+x2x,
y  = 1
y1+y2y,a n dz  = 1
z1+z2z.W e h a v e
(z1 + z2)z
  =( 1 − c)(x1 + x2)x
  + c(y1 + y2)y
 
=⇒ z














  =( 1− c
 )x
  + c
 y
 





which exceeds 0 since y  =( 0 ,0) and is less than 1 since
z1 + z2 =( 1− c)(x1 + x2)+c(y1 + y2)
31and x  =( 0 ,0) and c<1. In addition, x , y ,a n dz  all lie in the simplex ∆. Hence,
by the preceding result,
g(z





By homogeneity of g,
g(z)=( z1 + z2)g(z
 )
< (1 − c
 )(z1 + z2)g(x
 )+c
 (z1 + z2)g(y
 )
=( 1 − c)g(x)+cg(y)
Q.E.D.
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